feat(17-02): RSS feeds get an owner — platform-wide vs personal (D-02)

- TenderRssFeedSource.userId/tenantId (nullable): null = platform-wide
  (admin-managed, includes the existing service.bund.de default),
  set = personal feed owned by exactly one user
- Migration replaces url @unique with @@unique([userId, url]) — two
  users can now follow the same address independently; existing rows
  keep an empty owner (platform-wide, unchanged behavior)
- Service: listForUser/createForUser/createPlatform replace list/create
- Controller: GET/POST /rss-feeds move from @Roles(ADMIN,SUPER_ADMIN) to
  @UseModule('tender-radar'); POST with scope:'platform' still requires
  ADMIN/SUPER_ADMIN, checked inline (T-17-08)
- tenders.module.ts seed switched from upsert-on-url to find-then-create
  (Rule 3, pulled forward from Task 3): the new compound unique index
  requires a non-null userId in Prisma's generated type, so a
  platform-wide row can no longer be addressed via upsert

- Files modified: apps/api/prisma/schema.prisma, apps/api/prisma/migrations/20260812110000_tender_rss_feed_owner/migration.sql, apps/api/src/tenders/tender-rss-feed.service.ts, apps/api/src/tenders/dto/tender-rss-feed.dto.ts, apps/api/src/tenders/tenders.controller.ts, apps/api/src/tenders/tenders.module.ts, apps/api/src/tenders/tender-rss-feed.service.spec.ts, apps/api/src/tenders/tenders.controller.spec.ts
This commit is contained in:
2026-08-12 11:37:56 +02:00
parent 71dcb302a3
commit adb72f611f
8 changed files with 346 additions and 91 deletions
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
import {
IsBoolean,
IsIn,
IsOptional,
IsString,
IsUrl,
@@ -8,13 +9,14 @@ import {
} from 'class-validator';
/**
* DTO for admin-managed RSS feed sources (`TenderRssFeedSource`, D-14/D-08).
* DTO for RSS feed sources (`TenderRssFeedSource`, D-14/D-08; ownership
* split personal/platform-wide since Phase 17, Plan 02, D-02).
*
* `@IsUrl` here is only a COARSE well-formedness check (http/https,
* protocol required). The SUBSTANTIVE SSRF/denylist guard — rejecting
* DENYLISTED_PORTALS hostnames and private/loopback hosts — is enforced in
* `TenderRssFeedSourceService.assertUrlAllowed()`, NOT here (RESEARCH.md
* Pitfall 3: an admin-supplied RSS feed URL is runtime data, added long
* Pitfall 3: a user-supplied RSS feed URL is runtime data, added long
* after `SourceRegistry.register()`'s DI-boot-time denylist check runs —
* this DTO alone provides zero protection against a feed URL pointing at
* vergabe24/aumass or an internal host). `require_tld: false` deliberately
@@ -38,4 +40,15 @@ export class TenderRssFeedDto {
@IsOptional()
@IsBoolean()
isActive?: boolean;
/**
* A WISH only, never trusted as authorization by itself (D-02): 'platform'
* additionally requires the caller to hold ADMIN/SUPER_ADMIN, enforced
* server-side in `TendersController.createRssFeed` — never here or in the
* service. Default 'personal' so an ordinary module user's POST creates a
* feed they own without needing to know this field exists.
*/
@IsOptional()
@IsIn(['personal', 'platform'])
scope?: 'personal' | 'platform';
}
@@ -4,24 +4,40 @@ import { TenderRssFeedSourceService } from './tender-rss-feed.service';
/**
* TenderRssFeedSourceService.spec — proves the save-time hostname/SSRF
* guard (T-14-02-01, D-14/RESEARCH.md Pitfall 3): a runtime-admin-supplied
* guard (T-14-02-01, D-14/RESEARCH.md Pitfall 3): a runtime-user-supplied
* RSS feed URL is NOT covered by the code-level SourceRegistry denylist
* gate (that only checks an adapter's statically-declared `portals` array
* at DI-boot time) — this service is the separate, independent
* enforcement point.
* enforcement point. Also proves the ownership split introduced in Phase
* 17, Plan 02 (D-02): `listForUser` returns platform-wide feeds plus the
* caller's own, `createForUser` stamps an owner, `createPlatform` leaves
* ownership empty.
*
* Uses the same hand-rolled prisma-shaped fake convention as
* tender-notification-pref.service.spec.ts / tender-saved-search.service.spec.ts
* (in-memory Map, no live DB connection).
* (in-memory Map, no live DB connection). Unlike the pre-Phase-17 fake, this
* one EVALUATES the `where` clause (OR/AND/equality) so `listForUser`'s
* ownership scoping is actually proven, not just assumed.
*/
function matchesWhere(row: any, where: any): boolean {
if (!where) return true;
if ('OR' in where) {
return (where.OR as any[]).some((clause) => matchesWhere(row, clause));
}
if ('AND' in where) {
return (where.AND as any[]).every((clause) => matchesWhere(row, clause));
}
return Object.entries(where).every(([key, value]) => row[key] === value);
}
function makeFakePrisma() {
const rows = new Map<string, any>();
let seq = 0;
return {
tenderRssFeedSource: {
findMany: async ({ orderBy }: any) => {
const all = [...rows.values()];
findMany: async ({ where, orderBy }: any = {}) => {
let all = [...rows.values()].filter((row) => matchesWhere(row, where));
if (orderBy?.createdAt === 'asc') {
all.sort((a, b) => a.createdAt.getTime() - b.createdAt.getTime());
}
@@ -31,6 +47,8 @@ function makeFakePrisma() {
seq += 1;
const row = {
id: `feed-${seq}`,
userId: null,
tenantId: null,
createdAt: new Date(Date.now() + seq),
updatedAt: new Date(Date.now() + seq),
...data,
@@ -49,13 +67,13 @@ function makeFakePrisma() {
}
describe('TenderRssFeedSourceService', () => {
describe('create() — save-time hostname/SSRF guard (T-14-02-01)', () => {
describe('createPlatform() — save-time hostname/SSRF guard (T-14-02-01)', () => {
it('rejects a vergabe24.de feed URL (denylisted portal, D-14)', async () => {
const prisma = makeFakePrisma();
const service = new TenderRssFeedSourceService(prisma as any);
await expect(
service.create({
service.createPlatform({
url: 'https://www.vergabe24.de/rss.xml',
label: 'vergabe24',
}),
@@ -68,7 +86,7 @@ describe('TenderRssFeedSourceService', () => {
const service = new TenderRssFeedSourceService(prisma as any);
await expect(
service.create({ url: 'https://aumass.de/feed', label: 'aumass' }),
service.createPlatform({ url: 'https://aumass.de/feed', label: 'aumass' }),
).rejects.toThrow(BadRequestException);
expect(prisma.__rows.size).toBe(0);
});
@@ -78,7 +96,7 @@ describe('TenderRssFeedSourceService', () => {
const service = new TenderRssFeedSourceService(prisma as any);
await expect(
service.create({
service.createPlatform({
url: 'https://feeds.vergabe24.de/rss.xml',
label: 'vergabe24-sub',
}),
@@ -89,7 +107,7 @@ describe('TenderRssFeedSourceService', () => {
const prisma = makeFakePrisma();
const service = new TenderRssFeedSourceService(prisma as any);
const created = await service.create({
const created = await service.createPlatform({
url: 'https://www.service.bund.de/Content/Globals/Functions/RSSFeed/RSSGenerator_Ausschreibungen.xml',
label: 'service-bund',
});
@@ -106,7 +124,7 @@ describe('TenderRssFeedSourceService', () => {
const service = new TenderRssFeedSourceService(prisma as any);
await expect(
service.create({ url: 'file:///etc/passwd', label: 'local-file' }),
service.createPlatform({ url: 'file:///etc/passwd', label: 'local-file' }),
).rejects.toThrow(BadRequestException);
});
@@ -115,7 +133,7 @@ describe('TenderRssFeedSourceService', () => {
const service = new TenderRssFeedSourceService(prisma as any);
await expect(
service.create({ url: 'not-a-url', label: 'broken' }),
service.createPlatform({ url: 'not-a-url', label: 'broken' }),
).rejects.toThrow(BadRequestException);
});
@@ -124,7 +142,7 @@ describe('TenderRssFeedSourceService', () => {
const service = new TenderRssFeedSourceService(prisma as any);
await expect(
service.create({
service.createPlatform({
url: 'http://127.0.0.1:8080/internal-feed.xml',
label: 'internal',
}),
@@ -136,7 +154,7 @@ describe('TenderRssFeedSourceService', () => {
const service = new TenderRssFeedSourceService(prisma as any);
await expect(
service.create({ url: 'http://localhost:3000/feed', label: 'x' }),
service.createPlatform({ url: 'http://localhost:3000/feed', label: 'x' }),
).rejects.toThrow(BadRequestException);
});
@@ -145,7 +163,7 @@ describe('TenderRssFeedSourceService', () => {
const service = new TenderRssFeedSourceService(prisma as any);
await expect(
service.create({ url: 'http://10.0.0.5/feed', label: 'x' }),
service.createPlatform({ url: 'http://10.0.0.5/feed', label: 'x' }),
).rejects.toThrow(BadRequestException);
});
@@ -154,7 +172,7 @@ describe('TenderRssFeedSourceService', () => {
const service = new TenderRssFeedSourceService(prisma as any);
await expect(
service.create({ url: 'http://192.168.1.1/feed', label: 'x' }),
service.createPlatform({ url: 'http://192.168.1.1/feed', label: 'x' }),
).rejects.toThrow(BadRequestException);
});
@@ -163,7 +181,7 @@ describe('TenderRssFeedSourceService', () => {
const service = new TenderRssFeedSourceService(prisma as any);
await expect(
service.create({ url: 'http://[::1]/feed', label: 'x' }),
service.createPlatform({ url: 'http://[::1]/feed', label: 'x' }),
).rejects.toThrow(BadRequestException);
});
@@ -171,7 +189,7 @@ describe('TenderRssFeedSourceService', () => {
const prisma = makeFakePrisma();
const service = new TenderRssFeedSourceService(prisma as any);
const created = await service.create({
const created = await service.createPlatform({
url: 'https://example-tenders.invalid/rss.xml',
label: 'inactive-feed',
isActive: false,
@@ -181,29 +199,83 @@ describe('TenderRssFeedSourceService', () => {
});
});
describe('list()/remove()', () => {
it('list() returns created feeds ordered by createdAt asc', async () => {
describe('listForUser()/createForUser()/remove() — ownership split (Phase 17, Plan 02, D-02)', () => {
it('listForUser() returns platform-wide feeds ordered by createdAt asc when the caller has none of their own', async () => {
const prisma = makeFakePrisma();
const service = new TenderRssFeedSourceService(prisma as any);
await service.create({
await service.createPlatform({
url: 'https://a.example-tenders.invalid/rss.xml',
label: 'a',
});
await service.create({
await service.createPlatform({
url: 'https://b.example-tenders.invalid/rss.xml',
label: 'b',
});
const list = await service.list();
const list = await service.listForUser('u-anyone');
expect(list.map((f: any) => f.label)).toEqual(['a', 'b']);
});
it('listForUser(userId) includes platform-wide feeds plus this user\'s own personal feeds, never another user\'s', async () => {
const prisma = makeFakePrisma();
const service = new TenderRssFeedSourceService(prisma as any);
await service.createPlatform({
url: 'https://platform.example-tenders.invalid/rss.xml',
label: 'platform-feed',
});
await service.createForUser(
{ userId: 'user-a', tenantId: 'tenant-a' },
{ url: 'https://a-only.example-tenders.invalid/rss.xml', label: 'a-only' },
);
await service.createForUser(
{ userId: 'user-b', tenantId: 'tenant-b' },
{ url: 'https://b-only.example-tenders.invalid/rss.xml', label: 'b-only' },
);
const listForA = await service.listForUser('user-a');
expect(listForA.map((f: any) => f.label).sort()).toEqual(['a-only', 'platform-feed']);
const listForB = await service.listForUser('user-b');
expect(listForB.map((f: any) => f.label).sort()).toEqual(['b-only', 'platform-feed']);
});
it('createForUser() stamps the owner\'s userId/tenantId; createPlatform() leaves both null', async () => {
const prisma = makeFakePrisma();
const service = new TenderRssFeedSourceService(prisma as any);
const personal = await service.createForUser(
{ userId: 'user-a', tenantId: 'tenant-a' },
{ url: 'https://mine.example-tenders.invalid/rss.xml', label: 'mine' },
);
const platform = await service.createPlatform({
url: 'https://platform-only.example-tenders.invalid/rss.xml',
label: 'platform-only',
});
expect(personal.userId).toBe('user-a');
expect(personal.tenantId).toBe('tenant-a');
expect(platform.userId).toBeNull();
expect(platform.tenantId).toBeNull();
});
it('two different users may each register the same URL independently (D-02)', async () => {
const prisma = makeFakePrisma();
const service = new TenderRssFeedSourceService(prisma as any);
const sameUrl = 'https://shared.example-tenders.invalid/rss.xml';
await service.createForUser({ userId: 'user-a', tenantId: 'tenant-a' }, { url: sameUrl, label: 'a-copy' });
await service.createForUser({ userId: 'user-b', tenantId: 'tenant-b' }, { url: sameUrl, label: 'b-copy' });
expect(prisma.__rows.size).toBe(2);
});
it('remove() deletes the feed by id', async () => {
const prisma = makeFakePrisma();
const service = new TenderRssFeedSourceService(prisma as any);
const created = await service.create({
const created = await service.createPlatform({
url: 'https://c.example-tenders.invalid/rss.xml',
label: 'c',
});
@@ -4,31 +4,71 @@ import type { TenderRssFeedDto } from './dto/tender-rss-feed.dto';
import { DENYLISTED_PORTALS } from './source-registry';
/**
* TenderRssFeedSourceService — admin CRUD for the GLOBAL RSS feed list
* (`TenderRssFeedSource`, D-14/D-08). No `forTenant()`/RLS — this is
* platform-wide config, mirroring `TenderSourcePollConfig`'s stance.
* TenderRssFeedSourceService — CRUD for the RSS feed list
* (`TenderRssFeedSource`, D-14/D-08). No `forTenant()`/RLS — ownership is
* expressed via the nullable `userId`/`tenantId` columns, not tenant
* middleware (mirrors `TenderEmailConfig`'s per-user stance since Phase
* 17, Plan 01).
*
* Phase 17, Plan 02 (D-02): the feed list is two-part now — platform-wide
* feeds (`userId = null`, admin-managed, active for every tenant — this is
* where the service.bund.de default seeded since Phase 14 lives) and
* personal feeds (`userId` set, owned by exactly one user). Every module
* user can create a personal feed via `createForUser`; only ADMIN/
* SUPER_ADMIN may create a platform-wide one via `createPlatform` — that
* role check happens in the CONTROLLER (T-17-08), not here, mirroring
* `saveEmailConfig`'s "auth context resolved by the caller" convention.
*
* Save-time hostname/SSRF guard (T-14-02-01, RESEARCH.md Pitfall 3): RSS
* feed URLs are RUNTIME admin input, added long after
* feed URLs are RUNTIME user input, added long after
* `SourceRegistry.register()`'s DI-boot-time `DENYLISTED_PORTALS` check
* runs — that gate provides ZERO protection here. This service is the
* SEPARATE, independent enforcement point: reject non-http(s) schemes,
* reject any hostname containing a `DENYLISTED_PORTALS` entry (same
* constant as the code-level gate — single source of truth, D-14), and
* reject private/loopback hosts (SSRF guard, analog to T-10-06). Runs on
* BOTH create and update paths.
* EVERY write path (T-17-09) — it matters more now that ordinary users,
* not just admins, can reach it.
*/
@Injectable()
export class TenderRssFeedSourceService {
constructor(private readonly prisma: PrismaService) {}
async list() {
/**
* Every platform-wide feed (`userId = null`) plus this user's own
* personal feeds, oldest first (D-02).
*/
async listForUser(userId: string) {
return this.prisma.tenderRssFeedSource.findMany({
where: { OR: [{ userId: null }, { userId }] },
orderBy: { createdAt: 'asc' },
});
}
async create(dto: TenderRssFeedDto) {
/** Creates a personal feed owned by `ctx.userId` (D-02). */
async createForUser(
ctx: { userId: string; tenantId: string },
dto: TenderRssFeedDto,
) {
this.assertUrlAllowed(dto.url);
return this.prisma.tenderRssFeedSource.create({
data: {
url: dto.url,
label: dto.label,
isActive: dto.isActive ?? true,
userId: ctx.userId,
tenantId: ctx.tenantId,
},
});
}
/**
* Creates a platform-wide feed (`userId`/`tenantId` stay null). Callers
* MUST verify ADMIN/SUPER_ADMIN before calling this — this method itself
* enforces no authorization (T-17-08, done in TendersController).
*/
async createPlatform(dto: TenderRssFeedDto) {
this.assertUrlAllowed(dto.url);
return this.prisma.tenderRssFeedSource.create({
+42 -22
View File
@@ -89,15 +89,31 @@ function makeFakeRequest(userId = 'u1', tenantId = 'tenant1') {
/**
* Fake TenderRssFeedSourceService for controller-level wiring tests (Plan
* 14-02, Task 3). Default stubs echo/list-nothing; individual tests
* override via `.mockResolvedValueOnce`/reassigning the mock — including
* `create` rejecting with BadRequestException to prove the denylist error
* surfaces through the controller unchanged.
* 14-02, Task 3; ownership split since Phase 17, Plan 02, D-02). Default
* stubs echo/list-nothing; individual tests override via
* `.mockResolvedValueOnce`/reassigning the mock — including `createForUser`/
* `createPlatform` rejecting with BadRequestException to prove the
* denylist error surfaces through the controller unchanged.
*/
function makeFakeRssFeedService() {
return {
list: vi.fn(async () => [] as any[]),
create: vi.fn(async (dto: any) => ({ id: 'feed-1', isActive: true, ...dto })),
listForUser: vi.fn(async (_userId: string) => [] as any[]),
createForUser: vi.fn(
async (ctx: { userId: string; tenantId: string }, dto: any) => ({
id: 'feed-1',
isActive: true,
userId: ctx.userId,
tenantId: ctx.tenantId,
...dto,
}),
),
createPlatform: vi.fn(async (dto: any) => ({
id: 'feed-1',
isActive: true,
userId: null,
tenantId: null,
...dto,
})),
remove: vi.fn(async (_id: string) => ({ success: true })),
};
}
@@ -871,13 +887,14 @@ describe('TendersController — listTenders favOnly wiring (UI-04, T-11-10/11)',
});
});
describe('TendersController — RSS-feeds admin CRUD (Plan 14-02, D-14/D-08)', () => {
it('GET /rss-feeds delegates to tenderRssFeedSource.list()', async () => {
describe('TendersController — RSS-feeds personal + platform-wide (Plan 14-02 D-14/D-08, ownership split Phase 17 Plan 02 D-02)', () => {
it('GET /rss-feeds delegates to tenderRssFeedSource.listForUser(userId) and maps isPlatformWide, stripping userId', async () => {
const prisma = makeFakePrisma();
const scheduler = { setInterval: vi.fn(), stopJob: vi.fn() } as any;
const rssFeedService = makeFakeRssFeedService();
rssFeedService.list.mockResolvedValueOnce([
{ id: 'f1', url: 'https://service.bund.de/rss.xml', label: 'service-bund' },
rssFeedService.listForUser.mockResolvedValueOnce([
{ id: 'f1', url: 'https://service.bund.de/rss.xml', label: 'service-bund', userId: null },
{ id: 'f2', url: 'https://mine.invalid/rss.xml', label: 'mine', userId: 'u1' },
]);
const controller = new TendersController(
prisma as any,
@@ -889,15 +906,17 @@ describe('TendersController — RSS-feeds admin CRUD (Plan 14-02, D-14/D-08)', (
makeFakeEmailConfigService() as any,
);
const result = await controller.listRssFeeds();
const result = await controller.listRssFeeds(makeFakeRequest('u1', 'tenant1'));
expect(rssFeedService.list).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(rssFeedService.listForUser).toHaveBeenCalledWith('u1');
expect(result).toEqual([
{ id: 'f1', url: 'https://service.bund.de/rss.xml', label: 'service-bund' },
{ id: 'f1', url: 'https://service.bund.de/rss.xml', label: 'service-bund', isPlatformWide: true },
{ id: 'f2', url: 'https://mine.invalid/rss.xml', label: 'mine', isPlatformWide: false },
]);
expect(result.every((f: any) => !('userId' in f))).toBe(true);
});
it('POST /rss-feeds delegates to tenderRssFeedSource.create(dto)', async () => {
it('POST /rss-feeds with scope omitted creates a personal feed via createForUser({userId,tenantId}, dto)', async () => {
const prisma = makeFakePrisma();
const scheduler = { setInterval: vi.fn(), stopJob: vi.fn() } as any;
const rssFeedService = makeFakeRssFeedService();
@@ -911,17 +930,18 @@ describe('TendersController — RSS-feeds admin CRUD (Plan 14-02, D-14/D-08)', (
makeFakeEmailConfigService() as any,
);
const dto = { url: 'https://service.bund.de/rss.xml', label: 'service-bund' } as any;
await controller.createRssFeed(dto);
const dto = { url: 'https://mine.invalid/rss.xml', label: 'mine' } as any;
await controller.createRssFeed(dto, makeFakeRequest('u1', 'tenant1'));
expect(rssFeedService.create).toHaveBeenCalledWith(dto);
expect(rssFeedService.createForUser).toHaveBeenCalledWith({ userId: 'u1', tenantId: 'tenant1' }, dto);
expect(rssFeedService.createPlatform).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('POST /rss-feeds surfaces a BadRequestException from the service when the URL is denylisted (D-14)', async () => {
const prisma = makeFakePrisma();
const scheduler = { setInterval: vi.fn(), stopJob: vi.fn() } as any;
const rssFeedService = makeFakeRssFeedService();
rssFeedService.create.mockRejectedValueOnce(
rssFeedService.createForUser.mockRejectedValueOnce(
new BadRequestException("Der Host 'www.vergabe24.de' ist AGB-seitig für automatisierten Zugriff gesperrt"),
);
const controller = new TendersController(
@@ -935,10 +955,10 @@ describe('TendersController — RSS-feeds admin CRUD (Plan 14-02, D-14/D-08)', (
);
await expect(
controller.createRssFeed({
url: 'https://www.vergabe24.de/rss.xml',
label: 'vergabe24',
} as any),
controller.createRssFeed(
{ url: 'https://www.vergabe24.de/rss.xml', label: 'vergabe24' } as any,
makeFakeRequest('u1', 'tenant1'),
),
).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(BadRequestException);
});
+65 -22
View File
@@ -70,6 +70,17 @@ const DOE_SOURCE_TYPE = 'doe-opendata';
* apply the D-13 OR[global, mine] visibility filter for PRIVATE
* (email-alert) tenders — public tenders (D-03) remain visible to every
* tenant exactly as before; that part of D-13 is unaffected by D-01.
*
* Phase 14, Plan 02 (INGEST-04, D-14) originally made `GET`/`POST`/`DELETE
* /rss-feeds` per-handler `@Roles(ADMIN, SUPER_ADMIN)`-guarded, GLOBAL-only.
* Phase 17, Plan 02 (D-02) changed this: the feed list is now two-part —
* platform-wide feeds (unchanged, admin-only to create/delete) and personal
* feeds any module user may create and delete for themselves. `GET`/`POST
* /rss-feeds` are `@UseModule('tender-radar')`-gated; `POST`'s
* `scope: 'platform'` path re-checks ADMIN/SUPER_ADMIN inline
* (`extractTriageContext`'s `role`, T-17-08) since the route itself is no
* longer admin-only. `DELETE /rss-feeds/:feedId` ownership enforcement is
* described at that handler.
*/
@Controller('modules/tender-radar')
export class TendersController {
@@ -93,14 +104,21 @@ export class TendersController {
) {}
/**
* Extracts (userId, tenantId) for the per-user Triage routes — same
* Extracts (userId, tenantId, role) for the per-user routes — same
* pattern as FavoritesController.extractContext (T-08-06): userId/
* tenantId are ALWAYS read from the authenticated request context, never
* from a client-supplied body/query field (T-11-10 / V4 — IDOR).
* tenantId/role are ALWAYS read from the authenticated request context,
* never from a client-supplied body/query field (T-11-10 / V4 — IDOR).
*
* `role` was added in Phase 17, Plan 02 (D-02): `createRssFeed` needs the
* caller's role to decide whether a `scope: 'platform'` request is
* allowed (T-17-08), read from the SAME place `RolesGuard` reads it
* (`roles.guard.ts`) — one single spot in this controller resolves
* account data from the request.
*/
private extractTriageContext(req: Request) {
const userId = (req as any).user?.id;
const tenantId = (req as any).tenantId ?? (req as any).user?.tenantId;
const role = (req as any).user?.role;
if (!tenantId) {
throw new ForbiddenException('No tenant context');
@@ -109,7 +127,7 @@ export class TendersController {
throw new ForbiddenException('No user context');
}
return { userId, tenantId };
return { userId, tenantId, role };
}
/**
@@ -227,35 +245,60 @@ export class TendersController {
return { ok: true };
}
// ─── RSS-Feeds admin CRUD (Roles-guarded, GLOBAL, D-08/D-14) ───────────────
// ─── RSS-Feeds (ModuleGuard-gated, personal + platform-wide, Phase 17 D-02) ─
/**
* GET /modules/tender-radar/rss-feeds — list every admin-managed RSS feed
* (global, no tenantId — D-08). `@Roles`-guarded: this is a
* platform-admin action, not a per-tenant module feature, same stance as
* `source-config` above.
* GET /modules/tender-radar/rss-feeds — every platform-wide feed plus the
* requesting user's own personal feeds (D-02). Phase 17: replaced
* `@Roles(ADMIN, SUPER_ADMIN)` with `@UseModule('tender-radar')` — every
* module user can see (and add) their own feeds now, not just admins.
* Each entry gets a derived `isPlatformWide` flag; the raw `userId`
* ownership field is stripped from the response (T-17-12) — the UI has
* no need for it.
*
* MUST be declared before `@Get(':id')` below — same route-order pitfall
* as `source-config`/`coverage`/`triage`/... above (Pitfall 5): NestJS
* matches routes in declaration order, so a `@Get(':id')` placed first
* would capture "rss-feeds" as an id and shadow this handler.
* as `source-config`/`coverage`/`triage`/... above (Pitfall 5). Route
* position is UNCHANGED from before Phase 17 — no new route was added,
* only the guard and the handler body.
*/
@Get('rss-feeds')
@Roles(Role.ADMIN, Role.SUPER_ADMIN)
async listRssFeeds() {
return this.tenderRssFeedSource.list();
@UseModule('tender-radar')
async listRssFeeds(@Req() req: Request) {
const { userId } = this.extractTriageContext(req);
const feeds = await this.tenderRssFeedSource.listForUser(userId);
return feeds.map(({ userId: ownerUserId, ...rest }) => ({
...rest,
isPlatformWide: ownerUserId === null,
}));
}
/**
* POST /modules/tender-radar/rss-feeds — add a new global RSS feed URL.
* The save-time hostname/SSRF guard (D-14, T-14-02-01) lives in
* `TenderRssFeedSourceService.create()` — a denylisted/private-host URL
* surfaces as a 400 (BadRequestException) here, unchanged.
* POST /modules/tender-radar/rss-feeds — add a feed. `dto.scope` is a
* WISH, never trusted by itself: `scope: 'platform'` additionally
* requires the caller to hold ADMIN/SUPER_ADMIN (T-17-08), checked here
* against the SAME `role` source `RolesGuard` reads
* (`extractTriageContext`); any other/omitted scope creates a personal
* feed owned by the caller (D-02). The save-time hostname/SSRF guard
* (D-14, T-14-02-01) lives in `TenderRssFeedSourceService` and runs
* unchanged on both paths — a denylisted/private-host URL still surfaces
* as a 400 (BadRequestException) here.
*/
@Post('rss-feeds')
@Roles(Role.ADMIN, Role.SUPER_ADMIN)
async createRssFeed(@Body() dto: TenderRssFeedDto) {
return this.tenderRssFeedSource.create(dto);
@UseModule('tender-radar')
async createRssFeed(@Body() dto: TenderRssFeedDto, @Req() req: Request) {
const { userId, tenantId, role } = this.extractTriageContext(req);
if (dto.scope === 'platform') {
if (role !== Role.ADMIN && role !== Role.SUPER_ADMIN) {
throw new ForbiddenException(
'Nur Administratoren dürfen plattformweite RSS-Feeds anlegen.',
);
}
return this.tenderRssFeedSource.createPlatform(dto);
}
return this.tenderRssFeedSource.createForUser({ userId, tenantId }, dto);
}
/**
+22 -9
View File
@@ -282,20 +282,33 @@ export class TendersModule implements OnModuleInit {
// single default-active service.bund.de feed row — the one genuinely
// national/global RSS source. subreport-elvis has no single
// canonical URL (per-municipality instances, RESEARCH.md Pitfall 2)
// — deliberately ZERO subreport-elvis rows seeded; admins add the
// municipality feeds relevant to them via the RSS-Feeds admin UI
// — deliberately ZERO subreport-elvis rows seeded; admins/users add
// the municipality feeds relevant to them via the RSS-Feeds UI
// (Plan 14-02 Task 3).
await this.prisma.tenderRssFeedSource.upsert({
//
// Phase 17, Plan 02 (D-02): "upsert on url" no longer works — the
// unique index moved to (userId, url), and Prisma's generated
// compound-unique input type REQUIRES userId as a plain `string`
// (not `string | null | undefined`), so a platform-wide row
// (userId = null) can never be addressed through it. Switched to
// "find a platform-wide row with this url first, only create if
// none exists" — an ordinary equality condition has no such
// requirement. Still idempotent across repeated app starts.
const existingServiceBundFeed = await this.prisma.tenderRssFeedSource.findFirst({
where: {
userId: null,
url: 'https://www.service.bund.de/Content/Globals/Functions/RSSFeed/RSSGenerator_Ausschreibungen.xml',
},
update: {},
create: {
url: 'https://www.service.bund.de/Content/Globals/Functions/RSSFeed/RSSGenerator_Ausschreibungen.xml',
label: 'service-bund',
isActive: true,
},
});
if (!existingServiceBundFeed) {
await this.prisma.tenderRssFeedSource.create({
data: {
url: 'https://www.service.bund.de/Content/Globals/Functions/RSSFeed/RSSGenerator_Ausschreibungen.xml',
label: 'service-bund',
isActive: true,
},
});
}
this.logger.log('service.bund.de default RSS feed seeded (active)');
} catch (error) {
this.logger.error('Failed to seed service.bund.de RSS feed', error);