- Second, deliberately separate migration (pure hand-SQL, no Prisma-
generated DDL): ENABLE/FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY plus a
tenant_isolation_policy for each of the three new tables, following
the pattern of 20260618112133_rls_policies (Auth-Kerntabellen)
rather than the RLS-exempt Tender* app-layer tables
- Group/ModuleGrant compare tenantId directly against
current_tenant_id(); GroupMembership has no own tenantId and follows
the PasswordResetToken join pattern (groupId IN (SELECT id FROM
Group WHERE tenantId = ...))
- migration-sql.spec.ts extended with a second describe block covering
both migration files (6x ROW LEVEL SECURITY, 3x CREATE POLICY, the
join vs. direct-comparison shape)
- Re-ran the Task-2 end-to-end proof after applying this migration:
identical result (USER without grant 403 + empty list, USER with
direct grant 200 + slug present, ADMIN 200) — the app's DB role
(tessera) is a Postgres superuser with rolbypassrls=true, so it
bypasses RLS as documented as an acceptable outcome by the plan;
RLS remains the defense-in-depth net for any future non-superuser
connection
