schalli
e812738c3a
Global admin-managed RSS feed list (TenderRssFeedSource, D-08/D-14) with
a save-time hostname/SSRF guard (TenderRssFeedSourceService) — RSS feed
URLs are runtime admin input, so the code-level SourceRegistry denylist
gate does not cover them; a separate check rejects DENYLISTED_PORTALS
hostnames, non-http(s) schemes, and private/loopback hosts.
Adds TenderSourcePollConfig.pollGranularity ('day' | 'tick', D-15):
pollDueSources() branches per source — 'day' sources keep the existing
lastIngestedDay gate byte-unchanged, 'tick' sources (rss) fetch on every
active scheduler tick regardless of lastIngestedDay, since the day-cursor
gate was built for a genuine daily batch-export API and would otherwise
silently cap RSS to one fetch per calendar day.
Wires RssAdapter.fetchTenders() to fan out over active feed rows (native
fetch + AbortController 15s + response-size ceiling, catch-per-feed),
registers it in tenders.module.ts, and seeds the 'rss' poll config
active with pollGranularity='tick' plus a default-active service.bund.de
feed row (subreport-elvis has no single canonical URL — zero rows seeded,
admin adds relevant municipality feeds).
Migration applied locally per project convention (host -> container IP).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
42 lines
1.2 KiB
TypeScript
42 lines
1.2 KiB
TypeScript
import {
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IsBoolean,
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IsOptional,
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IsString,
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IsUrl,
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MaxLength,
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MinLength,
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} from 'class-validator';
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/**
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* DTO for admin-managed RSS feed sources (`TenderRssFeedSource`, D-14/D-08).
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*
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* `@IsUrl` here is only a COARSE well-formedness check (http/https,
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* protocol required). The SUBSTANTIVE SSRF/denylist guard — rejecting
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* DENYLISTED_PORTALS hostnames and private/loopback hosts — is enforced in
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* `TenderRssFeedSourceService.assertUrlAllowed()`, NOT here (RESEARCH.md
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* Pitfall 3: an admin-supplied RSS feed URL is runtime data, added long
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* after `SourceRegistry.register()`'s DI-boot-time denylist check runs —
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* this DTO alone provides zero protection against a feed URL pointing at
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* vergabe24/aumass or an internal host). `require_tld: false` deliberately
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* lets IP-literal URLs pass THIS validation layer so the service-layer
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* check can reject them with a clear, domain-specific SSRF error message
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* instead of a generic "invalid URL" one.
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*/
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export class TenderRssFeedDto {
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@IsUrl({
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protocols: ['http', 'https'],
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require_protocol: true,
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require_tld: false,
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})
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url!: string;
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@IsString()
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@MinLength(1)
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@MaxLength(200)
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label!: string;
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@IsOptional()
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@IsBoolean()
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isActive?: boolean;
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}
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