05b1d293d8
Alert-Postfach gehoert jetzt dem einzelnen Nutzer (userId @unique) statt
dem Mandanten (D-01) — ein zweiter Kollege desselben Mandanten kann sein
eigenes Postfach anbinden. tenantId bleibt denormalisiert (SMTP-Aufloesung,
Herkunftsmarkierung), wird auf create UND update mitgeschrieben.
- Handgeschriebene Migration (prisma migrate dev verweigert die
nicht-interaktive Shell): befuellt Bestandszeilen mit dem aeltesten
aktiven Administrator ihres Mandanten, entfernt verwaiste Zeilen ohne
Administrator, ersetzt die tenantId-Eindeutigkeit durch userId.
Lokal getestet (0 Bestandszeilen lokal und auf alpha — Zaehlung im
Task-1-Checkpoint), Index-Ergebnis verifiziert.
- TenderEmailConfigService.getConfigForApi/saveConfig auf userId als
Schluessel umgestellt; saveConfig nimmt {userId, tenantId}.
- TendersController: email-config-Routen von @Roles(ADMIN,SUPER_ADMIN)
auf @UseModule('tender-radar') umgestellt (Postfach ist jetzt
Nutzereinstellung); Route-Reihenfolge vor @Get(':id') unveraendert.
- Neue Seite /modules/tender-radar/my-sources ("Meine Quellen") mit dem
unveraenderten EmailAlertConfigForm; Hinweistext benennt D-05 (Tender
bleibt plattform-global — nur wer Quellen einspeist aendert sich).
- tenders.controller.spec.ts an neue Service-Signatur angepasst (Rule 3,
nicht im Plan gelistet, aber zum Kompilieren/Bestehen erforderlich).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
168 lines
6.5 KiB
TypeScript
168 lines
6.5 KiB
TypeScript
import { Injectable } from '@nestjs/common';
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import { CryptoService } from '../crypto/crypto.service';
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import { PrismaService } from '../prisma/prisma.service';
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import type { TenderEmailConfigDto } from './dto/tender-email-config.dto';
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/**
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* Prisma select for TenderEmailConfig — never includes encryptedInboxCreds.
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* T-07-12: Encrypted credential blob is excluded from all API responses.
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*/
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const EMAIL_CONFIG_SAFE_SELECT = {
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id: true,
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userId: true,
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tenantId: true,
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protocol: true,
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host: true,
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port: true,
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encryption: true,
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folder: true,
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senderFilter: true,
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domain: true,
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isActive: true,
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createdAt: true,
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updatedAt: true,
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// encryptedInboxCreds: NEVER included — T-07-12
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} as const;
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/**
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* TenderEmailConfigService — per-USER CRUD for the portal-alert mailbox
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* config (Phase 14, Plan 03, INGEST-05/CONFIG-02, D-06/D-07; ownership
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* moved from tenant to user in Phase 17, Plan 01, D-01). Structural clone
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* of DkvService's config half (safe-select + encrypt-preserve-empty
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* semantics), mirroring the exact same pattern already proven for DKV's
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* own (separate, D-03) mailbox config.
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*
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* Ownership (Phase 17, D-01): a mailbox belongs to exactly one user
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* (`userId @unique`) — two users at the same tenant each connect their own
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* inbox independently, neither can read or overwrite the other's config.
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* `tenantId` stays denormalized on every row (SMTP resolution, same role as
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* `tenantId` on TenderMatch) and is written on both create and update,
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* since a user's tenant can in principle change.
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*
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* Security:
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* - T-07-12: encryptedInboxCreds is excluded from every read-path select;
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* getConfigForApi returns `hasPassword: boolean` instead of the password.
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* - T-05-13: decrypted credentials only ever exist within a method's local
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* scope — never logged.
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* - T-17-01: userId/tenantId are supplied by the caller from the auth
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* context (TendersController.extractTriageContext) — this service never
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* derives ownership from anything the DTO carries.
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*
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* This service is used ONLY by the GET/PUT /email-config routes
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* (TendersController). EmailAlertAdapter's own poll-time fan-out decrypts
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* credentials independently via a direct CryptoService injection
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* (RESEARCH.md Pattern 1) — it does NOT go through this service, since the
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* adapter's cross-tenant `findMany({where:{isActive:true}})` read is a
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* deliberate platform-scheduler exception (see EmailAlertAdapter's
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* docstring), structurally different from this service's per-user CRUD.
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*/
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@Injectable()
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export class TenderEmailConfigService {
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constructor(
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private readonly prisma: PrismaService,
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private readonly crypto: CryptoService,
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) {}
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/**
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* Load config for API response: safe fields + decrypted username +
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* hasPassword flag. T-07-12: password is NEVER returned. Scoped strictly
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* by userId (T-17-01) — a user only ever reads their own mailbox.
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*/
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async getConfigForApi(userId: string) {
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const safe = await this.prisma.tenderEmailConfig.findUnique({
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where: { userId },
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select: EMAIL_CONFIG_SAFE_SELECT,
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});
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if (!safe) return null;
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let username: string | null = null;
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let hasPassword = false;
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try {
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const raw = await this.prisma.tenderEmailConfig.findUnique({ where: { userId } });
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if (raw?.encryptedInboxCreds) {
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const creds = JSON.parse(this.crypto.decrypt(raw.encryptedInboxCreds)) as {
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username?: string;
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password?: string;
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};
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username = creds.username ?? null;
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hasPassword = Boolean(creds.password);
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}
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} catch {
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/* ignore decrypt errors — return empty username, matches DkvService.getConfigForApi */
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}
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return { ...safe, username, hasPassword };
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}
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/**
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* Upsert TenderEmailConfig for a user.
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*
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* Credential handling (identical semantics to DkvService.saveConfig):
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* - dto.password non-empty: re-encrypt {username, password} together.
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* - dto.username non-empty but dto.password empty: preserve existing
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* password, re-encrypt with the new username.
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* - both empty/undefined: preserve existing encryptedInboxCreds entirely.
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*
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* tenantId is written on both create AND update (Phase 17, D-01): it is
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* denormalized, so if the resolved tenant for this user ever changes the
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* stored value must follow.
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*
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* T-07-12: Returns safe select (no encryptedInboxCreds).
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* T-05-13: Never logs decrypted credentials.
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*/
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async saveConfig(ctx: { userId: string; tenantId: string }, dto: TenderEmailConfigDto) {
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const { userId, tenantId } = ctx;
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let encryptedInboxCreds: string | undefined;
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const credChanged =
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(dto.password && dto.password.length > 0) ||
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(dto.username !== undefined && dto.username !== null);
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if (credChanged) {
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let username: string = dto.username ?? '';
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let password: string = dto.password ?? '';
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if (!dto.password || !dto.username) {
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try {
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const existing = await this.prisma.tenderEmailConfig.findUnique({ where: { userId } });
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if (existing?.encryptedInboxCreds) {
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const stored = JSON.parse(this.crypto.decrypt(existing.encryptedInboxCreds)) as {
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username?: string;
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password?: string;
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};
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if (!dto.username) username = stored.username ?? '';
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if (!dto.password) password = stored.password ?? '';
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}
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} catch {
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// Ignore decrypt errors — will overwrite with whatever was provided
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}
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}
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encryptedInboxCreds = this.crypto.encrypt(JSON.stringify({ username, password }));
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}
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const data: Record<string, unknown> = {
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protocol: dto.protocol,
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encryption: dto.encryption,
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...(dto.host !== undefined && { host: dto.host }),
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...(dto.port !== undefined && { port: dto.port }),
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...(dto.folder !== undefined && { folder: dto.folder }),
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...(dto.senderFilter !== undefined && { senderFilter: dto.senderFilter }),
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...(dto.isActive !== undefined && { isActive: dto.isActive }),
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...(dto.domain !== undefined && { domain: dto.domain }),
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...(encryptedInboxCreds !== undefined && { encryptedInboxCreds }),
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};
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// tenantId is written on BOTH create and update — it is denormalized
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// (Phase 17, D-01), so a user's resolved tenant must always overwrite
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// whatever was stored previously, not just be set once on create.
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return this.prisma.tenderEmailConfig.upsert({
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where: { userId },
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create: { userId, tenantId, ...data },
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update: { tenantId, ...data },
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select: EMAIL_CONFIG_SAFE_SELECT,
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});
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}
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}
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